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This Country Economic Memorandum (CED) provides a brief assessment of
recent economic developments in Korea, and of their implications for the near
term, based on a visit to Korea in December 1985. The CEM was prerared by P.
Iqbal, in conjunction with the Macroeconomic-Industrial Po icy Report (6138-
KO) which addresses the broader issues of macroeconomic management and outlook
for the medium-term, and provides an in-depth assessment of industrial sector
trends and policies. D.M. Leipziger directed the overall program of
macroeconomic and industrial work. Research assistance was provided by S.Y.
Song.
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KOREA
COUNTRY ECONOMIC MEMORANDUM
A. Introduction and Overview
1.01 The most noteworthy aspect of Kovea's economic development in recent
years has been achievement of a respectable rate of growth of GNP together
with a reduced rate of inflation and a lower current account deficit. While
GNP grew at an average rate of 8% during 1982-84, inflation was reduced from
25.6% in 1980 to about 4% in 1984, and the current account deficit fell from
8.7% of GNP to about 1.7%. By the end of 1984 Korea could be said to have
recovered from the shocks experienced at the turn of the decade and to be in
the process of consolidating a development trajectory characierized by sus-
tainable high growth and both internal and external balance.- During 1985
the pace of development faltered but the manner in which the economy was
managed and subsequent international economic developments in early 1986
indicate that the policy and performance trends established during 1982-84
were not reversed. These trends can thus be expected to continue to charac-
terize Korean economic development in the foreseeable future.
1.02 Korea's GNP is estimated to have grown at 5X in real terms in
1985. This is below both the Fifth Plan target rate of 7.5% for the year as
well as the rates achieved in 1983 (11.9%) and 1984 (8.4%) (see Table 1.1).
The chief cause of the relatively lower GNP growth rate was a sharp decline in
the growth of exports, which was caused in turn by the generally sluggish GNP
performance of the OECD countries, and in particular of the US. As the GNP
growth rate in the industrialized countries dropped from 4.9% in 1984 to 2.81
in 1985 (and in the US from 6.8% to 2.6%), their volume of imports declined
from 11.7% to 6.1%. This falloff in OECD import demand had severe conse-
quences for Korean exports which grew at barely 2.3%. This was disappointing
in comparison with Ehe nearly 10% growth recorded in 1984 and initially
expected for 1985.2
1.03 Still the situation could have been far worse and credit for
preventing a more precipitous decline must be given to the flexibility
1/ A series of adverse events affected the Korean economy during 1979-80.
These were the second oil shock, the onset of a world recession, the
surge in international interest rates, poor harvests and political
instability generated by the assassination of President Park Chung Hee.
2/ The national accounts data used in this memorandum are based on a new
methodology adopted by Korea in 1985. As a result, some of the
historical data presented here may appear unfamiliar.
demonstrated in macroeconomic policies Juring the year.31 As developments in
the first half confirmed that a sharp deceleration was in the offing the
authorities responded with a number of remedial measures. A policy package
was devised which contained essentially four elements: (i) a decision to
depreciate the won so as to recover competitiveness by reversing the apprecia-
tion that had occurred in late 1984 ; (ii) additional credit for investment in
facilities producing for export, a measure which contributed to the increase
in net domestic assets of the domestic banking system at 24% rather than the
141 targeted in the Economic Management Plan for 1985; (iii) the provision of
special tax and depreciation incentives to promote investment in selected
areas; and (iv) the passage of a supplementary budget (of about 5% the size of
the original budget) to inject selective fiscal stimulus. As these policies
were brought into play in the second half, aggregate demand began to recover
and the economy finished out the year with a respectable, if below expecta-
tions, GNP growth rate of 5.1%. Depreciation of the won prevented a sharper
drop in exports and domestic demand expansion has offset some of the slack
produced by the unexpected deceleration of export growth. At the same time,
the current account deficit was further reduced to $882 million (1% of GNP)
and inflation was kept below 4%.
1.04 The alignment of macroeconomic policy instruments and ta gets in
1985 has sharpened some abiding concerns of the Government and hig.lighted
some new ones. Among the former concerns is the matter of Korea's axternal
debt. Progress in decreasing the rate of growth of the outstanding external
debt was slowed in 1985 as Government sanctioned above-target borrowing to
meet unanticipated payments on debts associated with the overseas construction
business. Part of the rise in debt was also due to the need to finance a
larger proportion of exports on a deferred payment basis in order to boost
exports in a sagging market. Another concern has been that inflation might be
reignited by the substantial depreciation undertaken in 1985. While no signs
of an inflationary surge were detected in 1985, there was some concern that
this could happen in 1986. Among emerging concerns is the matter of white
collar unemployment. The slowdown in growth has coincided with an increase in
the supply of college-graduating job-seekers. This increase is the logical
consequence of a policy to increase eirolment rates in 1981, a step undertaken
in part to deal with the unemployment problem then developing.
1.05 From most present indications it appears that 1986 will allow Korea
to return to the high-export/high-growth trajectory envisioned in the Fifth
Plan, and to gear up for similar performance over the course of the Sixth
Plan. An extremely favorable sequence of developments in the last few months
has made it likely that the shortfalls experienced in 1985 will be adequately
made up in 1986. Three principal developments are expected to boost Korea
back to its planned growth path: (i) the recent steep decline in the price of
oil; (ii) the decline in international interest rates; and (iii) the recent
sharp appreciation of the Japanese yen. All of these developments should make
3/ That the situation could have been worse is illustrated by Korea's better
performance in comparison with that of its peers among the newly-
industrialized countries (NICs).
it easier for Korea to achieve balance of payments equilibrium and high GNP
growth rates without exceeding its self-imposed constraint on additional
external debt and without experiencing higher rates of inflation. The decline
in the price of oil should help Korea directly by reduLing its import bill and
indirectly by sparking a higher iate of world economic growth and trade. The
appreciation of the yen should stoke Korea's export engine and enable it to
increase its export market share.
B. Output and Demand Developments
1.06 Consumption. In terms of the components of aggregate demand, the
slow down in 1985 is reflected largely in a sharp reduction in export growth
and in fixed investment growth (see Table 1.1). Consumption has played a
rather passive role in that it did not grow strongly in the high growth years
of 1983 and 1984, nor did it drop sharply in the low growth year of 1985. Its
rate of growth has decelerated steadily from 7.2% in 1983 to 5.2% in 1984 to
4.8% in 1985. Within this rather steady trend, however, are concealed rather
dramatic changes in the rates of growth of private and government consump-
tion. While private consumption grew at 6.0% in 1984, government consumption
decelerated sharply to 0.5% (from 5.3% in 1983). Then, as private consumption
growth fell to around 4.6% in 1985 government consumption accelerated to 6.1%
to offset the slack.
Table 1.1: GNP BY EXPENDITURE, 1980 CONSTANT PRICES
(Rate of change)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 /a
Consumption 3.6 4.2 7.2 5.2 4.8
Private consumption 3.2 4.8 7.5 6.0 4.6
Public consumption 6.2 0.8 5.3 0.5 6.1
Gross domestic investment 6.3 0.1 17.5 18.6 1.6
Fixed investment -4.0 12.9 17.1 10.7 2.8
Changes in stocks 2,613.7 -122.7 -1.9 421.7 -21.8
Exports of goods and services 15.0 6.5 15.5 10.0 2.3
Imports of goods and services 4.5 2.0 10.9 10.1 -1.5
GDP 7.4 5.7 10.9 8.6 5.2
GNP 6.6 5.4 11.9 8.4 5.1
Change in stocks/GNP (X) 3.0 -0.6 -0.6 1.7 1.3
/a Preliminary.
Source: Bank of Korea, New System of National Accounts of Korea.
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1.07 Investment. There was a slump in the rate of growth of gross
domestic investment in 1985. After having giown at an average of about 18%
during 1983 and 1984, gross domestic investment grew at a paltry 1.6% in
1985. Plant and equipment investment was stopped in its tracks as export
orders sagged in the first half of 1985. It recovered modestly toward the end
of the year in response to specific credit incentives. Residential construc-
tion investment played a role in propping up aggregate demand also as Govern-
ment accelerated a public housing program begun in late 1984.
1.08 Despite the overall slump in plant and equipment investment in 1985,
there was considerable activity in some manufacturing subsectors such as
autos, food processing, machinery and transportation. The rate of growth of
investment in the automobile subsector, for example, was 120% and that in food
processing was 65%. The spurt in the automobile subsector was linked to the
tremendous success of Korean automobile exports during 1985, primarily of
Hyundai cars in Canada, and to the prospects of entering the lucrative US
market in 1986. Hyundai's success encouraged other large corporations, such
as Daewoo and Kia, to expand capacity in automobile production. Investment in
this sector is expected to grow significantly in 1986 also. Among sectors
experiencing a decrease in the rate of investment in 1985 were textiles (-34Z),
shipbuilding (-39%) and petrochemicals (-17%). Textiles have been in a state
of structural decline for several years partly because of increasing protec-
tionism in OECD countries. Shipping and shipbuilding are in a protracted
slump characterized by worldwide excess capacity and cutthroat pricing.
1.09 As a proportion of GUP, gross domestic investment dropped slightly
from 31.9% in 1984 to 31.2% in 1985. Gross domestic savings, however,
continued to rise and reached a level of 28.6% in 1985. The improvement in
savings since 1983 has come about largely because of an increase in the house-
hold savings rate which has jumped from 7.1% in 1983 to 10.0% in 1985.
Corporate and government savings have risen at slower rates. Savings behavior
in 1985 may well reflect the strong economic performance of 1983 and 1984
(with a lag) as well as continuing high real deposit interest rates.
C. Employment, Wages and Prices
1.10 Employment Trends. The employment picture (see Table 1.2) contains
aspects which are difficult to reconcile. On the one hand, total employment
rose in 1985 (by 3.6%) after having declined in 1984 (by 0.7%) and having
stagnated in 1983 (at 0.6% growth). Official statistics indicate that the
unemployment rate remained virtually unchanged (at 4%) between 1984 and
1985. On the other hand, there is a pervasive belief in policy making circles
that a structural unemployment problem has been gathering speed for several
years and has worsened in 1985.
1.11 Among the trends thought to affect employment is a shift, beginning
in the mid 1970s, in the pattern of manufacturing output growth away from
light industries to heavy and high technology industries. Since the latter
are characterized by higher capital intensity, this intersectoral shift has
reduced the employment elasticity of the manufacturing sector during the past
10 years. It is thought that a 1% growth in output now creates jobs for about
40,000 people, whereas in the early 1970s it would have accommodated about
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60,000 people. Since about 400,000 job seekers are estimated to enter the
market every year, it would seem that, if all the Jobs had to be created in
the manufacturing sector, a 10% growth in manufacturing output would be
required. This did not happen in 1985 and hence the concern about rising
urban unemployment.
Table 1,2: KOREA% EMPLOYMENT INDICATORS
('000)
X change
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 (1984/85)
Economically active
population 14,710 15,080 15,128 14,984 15,554 3.8
Employment 14,048 14,404 14,515 14,417 14,935 3.6
Agriculture, forestry
and fishing 4,806 4,623 43,314 3,909 3,722 -4.8
Mining & manufacturing 2,996 3,157 3,383 1,493 3,650 4.5
Social overhead capital
and other services 6,247 6,644 6,818 7,015 7,559 7.8
Unemployment 661 656 613 567 619 9.2
Unemployment rate (X) 4.5 4.4 4.1 3.8 4.0 -
Source: Bank of Korea, Monthly Statistical Bulletin.
1.12 Together with the decreasing employment elasticity on the demand
side, some developmen.s on the supply side are also thought to have been
important. In particular, there has been an increase in the supply of college
graduat s and in the number of workers returning from overseas construction
jobs. It is reported that the number of college graduates doubled from 62,000
in 1982 to 118,000 in 1985, while their employment rate has shrunk from 89% in
1982 to 69Z in 1985. The increase in supply is dae to a sharp increase in
enrollment rates permitted in 1981, partly to defu_e an open unempioyment
problem that had developed at that time and partly to respond to an increasing
demand for college seats (inspired by the large wage differential between high
school and college graduates). The number of Korean workers in overseas
construction jobs has declined from 172,000 in 1982 to around 86,000 in 1985,
with 45,000 workers returning in 1985 alone. This is clearly linked to the
declining construction activity in the Middle East.
1.13 Wage Developments. Nominal wages in manufacturing rose by 9% in
1985 signaling an upturn in the rate of growth of nominal wages from 8.1% in
1984. Nonetheless, these rates of growth are far below those experienced in
the 1970s and early 1980s end do not necessarily imply that the wage austerity
program underway since 1981 is unravelling. Real wages in manufacturing have
- 6 -
also risen (by 5%) in 1985, as compared to a 4% rise in 1984. The pattern of
wage increases has not been uniform. The food and beverage industry experi-
enced a 10X growth in nominal wages while textiles, clothing and leather
experienced a 6% growth. This reflects the fact that the former sector has a
relatively captive domestic market which has been expanding while the latter
sector has to cope with an increasingly competitive export market. The
relative strengths of the home and export markets in 1984 and 1985 were
reflected in the changes in the rates of growth of nominal wages in these and
other manufacturing subsectors.
1.14 Wage guidance is provided to some extent by the nature of wage
settlementr- in the public sector. Public sector wage rate growth has been
decelerating since 1981 and was effectively frozen in 1984. A 4% growth has
been permitted in 1985. While the general pattern of deceleration of both
public and private sector wage growth in recent years indicates that wage
guidance does have an influence on private sector wage settlements, other
evidence indicates that many other factors are important. In particular, the
variation in wage rate growth across manufacturing subsectors indicates that
wages respond to variations in subsector performance.
1.15 Price Behavior. The most prominent aspect of price developments in
recent years has been the reduction of the rate of inflation in 1980-83 and
its stability since (see Table 1.3). In 1985 price stability was maintained
despite a signUicant depreciation of the won. Wholesale prices have risen by
barely 1%, consumer prices have risen by about 3% and the GNP deflator rose at
abzut 4%. Such low rates of inflation are due primarily to continuing
declines in the prices of oil and other commodities as well as to low infla-
tion in Korea's major industrialized trading partners. Mineral products,
principally oil, have a 33% weight in Korea's import price index and agricul-
tural products, principally sugar, cotton and food grains, have a 21%
weight. Both of these categories have experienced price weakness in recent
years and especially in 1985. The agricultural product price index for
Korea's imports declined almost 12% in 1985, contributing powerfully to the
overall decline in the import price index. The low rate of inflation in the
OECD countries from which Korea purchases manufactured products has also
helped maintain price stability in Korea. Manufactured imports, which account
for almost half of the import price index, experienced a 3.4% decline in
prices in 1985, and this has helped offset the inflationary impact of the
depreciation of the won. Finally, while the behavior of oil prices has
contributed to price stability in recent years, its contribution is expected
to be even greater in the near future because Korea is now purchasing a larger
proportion of its oil imports on the spot market where prices have fallen
sharply in recent months.
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Table 1.3: CHANGES IN PRICE INDICES
(1980 = 100)
Weights 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
(Annual) ---------
Wholesale prices 100 20.4 4.7 0.2 0.7 0.6
Consumer prices 100 21.3 7.3 3.4 2.3 2.6
import prices ($) 100 4.0 -5.1 -4.4 0.0 -4.1
Agricultural products (21) -2.2 -16.3 0.4 4.7 -11.9
Mineral products (33) 12.3 -3.3 -11.5 -4.2 -0.9
Manufactured products (46) 0.8 -1.7 -0.7 1.2 -3.4
Export prices ($) 100 3.0 -3.7 -2.8 1.8 -3.5
GNP deflator 100 15.9 7.1 3.0 3.9 4.0
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook.
D. Fiscal and Monetary Developments
1.16 Fiscal Developments. The hallmark of fiscal policy in recent years
has been a shrinking public sector deficit in relation to the GNP. This ratio
declined from 4.6% of GNP in 1981 to 1.4% in 1984, and stayed at approximately
this level in 1985 despite supplementary expenditures on infrastructure
projects and rural assistance programs amounting to about 5% of the original
budget. Resources for these additional expenditures were created through a
rearrangement of existing expenditures, mainly through a postponement of a
one-time transfer to local governments and through savings in operating
expenses. Overall expenditures did not rise above original targets for the
year and the ratio of expenditures to GNP remained at about 21.51, the same as
in 1984.
1.17 The ratio of total revenues to GNP has been around 19-20% in recent
years. The composition of revenues has remained roughly stable despite
variations in tax and tariff rates because of offsetting movements in tax and
tariff bases. A tax reform enacted in 1982 lowered effective corporation tax
rates from 27.8% to 26.7% in 1984. A similar trend is seen in personal income
tax rates which fell from 17.9% to 15.1%. Fiscal policy in 1985 also featured
tax incentives for business investment and a shortening of the depreciation
period for machines and equipment, but these did not affect tax collections
appreciably during the year.
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Table 1.4: FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS, 1980-85
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Consolidated Public Sector (in billion won)
Revenue 7,,281 9,247 10,074 11,595 13,040 13,881
Expenditure 8,455 11,358 12,296 12,546 13,963 15,169
Deficit -1,174 -2,111 -2,222 -951 -923 -1,288
Consolidated Public Sector (in X of CUP)
Revenue 19.6 20.2 19.4 19.9 20.0 19.9
Expenditure 22.6 24.8 23.7 21.5 21.4 21.4
Deficit -3.2 -4.6 -4.3 -1.6 -1.4 -1.5
Consolidated Public Sector (annual percentage change)
Revenue 27.0 8.9 15.1 12.5 6.6
Expenditure 34.3 8.3 2.0 11.3 7.3
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook.
1.18 Tax revenues rose 92 from 10.9 trillion won in 1984 to 11.8 trillion
won in 1985 largely on account of increased collections from corporate and
income taxes made possible by the high growth in nominal incomes and profits
in 1984. Since 1985 was a comparatively poor year for business, tax
collection in 1986 might suffer. Revenues were also affected by a tariff
reform begun in 1983 which reduced the average tariff rate from 211 to 22X in
1984. During 1985 tariff revenue totalled 1.6 trillion won. This was lower
than expected from the effects of the large depreciation, partly because the
collection from oil imports was considerably lowy and partly because of
continued reductions in the average tariff rate.-
4/ The budget for fiscal 1986 is in keeping with the restrained spirit of
recent budgets. Expenditures and revenues are set to rise by 10.1X in
nominal terms thereby keeping pace with the expected rise in nominal
CUP. On the expenditure side, social development expenditures are set to
increase by 28.2X and education by 11.1X while economic service
expenditures are due to rise at a much below average rate of 1.6Z. This
is also in keeping with the shift in recent years, in the composition of
expenditures towards social services a significant reduction in the
subsidy given to the grain fund (-54X) is also programmed. The
distribution of the revenue burden across different sources will remain
roughly the same as in 1985 with the exception of revenue from monopoly
proceeds (+18.7%) and nontax income (-15.42). The overall tax to GNP
ratio is to remain at about 19.3%.
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1.19 Monetary Developments. Monetary policy has also been characterized
by restraint in recent years. The rate of growth of the net domestic assets
(NDA) of the banki-ag system decelerated from 39% in 1981 to 14% in 1984 (see
Table 1.5). There was a reve.sal in 1985, however, as net domestic assets
were permitted to expand at about 21%. This was probably the most significant
monetary development of 1985 and it was caused by three factors. One factor
was the need to provide about $500 million dollars of credit to repay the
foreign debt obligations of some Korean construction companies, an unantici-
pated consequence of the government-sponsored restructuring in this sector. A
second factor was the unexpected slowdown in investment and export growth
which prodded the authorities into expanding credit to resuscitate aggregate
demand and prevent too sharp a fall in GNP growth. The third factor was the
unexpectedly large increase in deposits in the banking system that occurred in
response to the introduction of new savings instruments bearing higher rates
of interest. Thus while some of the credit expansion had to be financed
through additional foreign borrowing and a reduction of net foreign assets, a
substantial part was financed through increased domestic resources of the
banking system.
1.20 The behavior of alternative measures of monetary aggregates
indicates that the monetary relaxation of 1985 was selective in its effects
and did not signify a major reversal of the liquidity situation of the
economy. For example, while domestic credit extended through the banking
system did jump in 1985 the rate of growth of overall liquidity in the finan-
cial system, including credit extended by nonbank financial institution
(NBFIs), did not increase significantly; it accelerated modestly from 22% in
1984 to 22.5% in 1985. This indicates that banks gained incremental deposits
and credit shares in the system at the expense largely of NBFIs. This devel-
opment reverses the trend begun a few years ago when the greater flexibility
allowed to NBFI's in setting deposit and lending rates led to an increasing
shift of financial assets from banks to NBFI's. Concern about the deteriorat-
ing asset base and profitability of banks led to a redaction of regulatory
discrimination against banks in 1984 and 1985; banks have been allowed to
offer higher deposit and lending interest rates and a variety of flexible
savings instruments since mid-1984.
1.21 The fact that the change in the rate of growth of overall liquidity
in 1985 was in fact rather modest may also explain why the impact of monetary
policy on investment has been modest. A sizable NBFI segment in the financial
system has consequences for the conduct of monetary policy, since it
constrains the ability to reach monetary targets when liquidity expansion in
the banking system is offset by contractionary movements in the NBFI segment.
1.22 Monetary policy in 1985 also featured the initiation and the rever-
sal of controls on credit to large conglomerates. In an effort to prevent
excessive corporate reliance on commercial bank loans and to foster increased
recourse to internally generated finance and equity finance, the authorities
placed limits on the borrowings of 705 large companies. If a business group
had more than W 100 billion in outstanding debt, it was not permitted to
increase its debt without the sanction of its prime bank. In addition, the
credit of the 30 largest conglomerates was frozen at end-1983 levels. These
controls proved extremely unpopular and, in the event, deteriorating exports
and investment necessitated their relaxation in the latter part of the year.
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Table 1.5: RATES OF CHANCE OF MONETARY AGGCEGATES
(Z)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
MH /a 13.4 24.2 25.9 9.9 10.8
M2 7i 27.4 28.1 19.5 10.7 15.6
M3 7T 30.8 33.2 21.6 20.0 21.3
Net domestic assets 39.1 33.5 18.3 13.5 20.9
Domestic credit A /d 31.2 25.0 15.7 13.2 18.0
Private sector credit 26.3 25.1 17.6 14.3 19.0
Domestic credit B /e 33.9 29.8 11.9 22.0 22.5
/a Ml - currency plus demand deposits.
Tb M2 - Ml plus time and savings deposits.
T,c M3 = K2 plus other financial institution deposits and debenture issues
plus commercial bills and CDs.
/d Domestic credit A = Domestic credit extended by banking system.
Te Domestic credit B = As above plus domestic credit extended by nonbank
financial institutions.
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook.
1.23 In 1985 the nonperforming loan problems involving Korean overseas
construction firms and shipping companies worsened. The amounts involved were
apparently large enough to threaten the position of several banks. Government
implemented a special loan program in December 1985 to help affected banks.
Under this program a total of 300 billion won was lent at 3Z (rather than the
standard 5X) to ailing commercial banks to help them cover losses from the
nonpayment of interest and principal on nonperforming loans. The loans are
repayable in one year but may be extended by the Bank of Korea's authority.5/
1.24 Interest Rate Movements. The last two years have seen gradual
upward adjustments of nominal interest rates in the regulated banking sys-
tems. Both deposit and lending rates have been raised. Greater spreads have
been allowed to commercial banks so as to enable them to cover some risk
premium on their loans and to improve their profitability. Higher deposit
rates and a variety of new savings instruments (such as CDs) have been permit-
ted with a view to enhancing financial savings. Deposit interest rates now
5/ Similar measures were taken in 1972 to enable banks to recover from bad
loans. The "emergency" measures enacted then remained in effect until
1982.
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vary from 101 to 13% depending on maturity while lending rates are allowed to
move in a band from 10 to 13.5X depending on the lenders' assessment of
risk. On average, nominal interest rates have moved up by about two points
during 1984 and 1985. The rise in interest rates and the proliferation of
savings instruments has resulted in large increases in the amount of financial
savings in the form of bank deposits and also in the amount of overall
savings. Total bank deposits increased by 81 in 1984 and 16.51 in 1985 while
the gross national savings rate rose from 24.8Z in 1983 to 27.4% in 1984 to
28.61 in 1985. Thus the ig7rease in financial savings was not entirely due to
substitution among assets.-
E. Trade Account Performance
1.25 The Current Account. The most significant development in the
current account in recent years has been the reduction of the deficit from
$5.3 billion in 1980 (8.7% of GNP) to $9 billion in 1985 (11 of GNP). In
1985, export growth was a paltry 2.3% and the improvement in the current
account deficit occurred largely because of a reduction in import value. The
value of merchandise imports fell by almost 3.51 in 1985, from about
$27.4 billion to $26.4 billion. Since the import price index fell by about 41
this suggests that volume actually increased slightly, a fact consistent with
the slight growth of exports which are, in Korea's case, highly reliant on
imported inputs. The recent sharp drop in the price of oil, an item which, in
1985, accounted for about 21% of the value of imports, is expecte4,to have
extremely beneficial effects for the balance of payments in 1986."/ The
invisible account has also contributed to the improvement in the current
account deficit. As the trade deficit narrowed from $4.4 billion in 1980 to
$1.1 billion in 1984, the invisible deficit was reduced from $1.4 billion to
$400 million in 1983. In 1984 and 1985, however, the invisibles deficit
widened again, to $800 million and $1.4 billion respectively, largely on
account of reduced earnings from overseas construction and increased interest
payments on the external debt. In 1985, overseas construction receipts
amounted to just under $1 billion, down 43% from the $1.7 billion registered
6/ In March 1986, Government cut lending rates by 0.5-2.0Z, citing as a
rationale the need to keep real rates from becoming a burden on Korean
corporations and reducing their competitiveness on world markets.
Deposit rates were left unchanged, presumably to maintain the incentive
for saving.
7/ A $1 drop in the price of oil reduces Korea's import bill directly by
about $200 million. The effect on the balance of payments would depend,
in addition, on the effects of an oil price drop on Korea's exports, on
the additional imports generated by the income effect of this price
change, and also on the degree of substitution away from non-oil sources
of energy imports.
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Table 1.6: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SUMMARY, 1981-85
(US$ million)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Current account -4,646 -2,650 -1,606 -1,371 -882
Trade Balance -3,628 -2,594 -1,764 -1,036 -30
Exports 20,671 20,879 23,204 26,335 26,405
Imports 24,299 23,474 24,967 27,371 26,436
Service Balance -1,518 -554 -435 -876 -1,432
Receipts 6,598 7,476 7,179 7,316 6,641
Payments 8,117 8,031 7,613 8,192 8,073
Transfers (net) 501 499 592 541 580
Long-Term Capital (Net) 2,842 1,230 1,270 2,000 1,084
Loans and investments 3,052 2,896 2,569 2,454 2,238
Amortization -1,315 -1,430 -1,672 -1,768 -1,832
Exports on credit 57 -350 -677 181 -974
Others 1,048 114 1,050 1,185 1,652
Basic balance -1,804 -1,419 -336 629 201
Short-term capital (net) -82 4 894 -758 -538
Errors and omissions -411 -1,296 -942 -889 -878
Overall balance -2,297 -2,711 -384 -1,018 -1,215
Source: Bank of Korea.
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Table 1.7: COMPOSITION OF EXPORTS BY MAJOR ITEM
(%)
1975 1980 1984
Primary 18.4 10.1 8.7
Manufacturing 81.6 89.9 91.3
Ligh.lt 57.1 49.1 39.6
Textiles and garments 35.4 29.5 24.3
Footwear 3.8 5.0 4.6
Heavy and chemical 24.5 40.8 51.7
Iron and steel 4.6 9.5 7.0
Metals 2.3 4.3 4.8
Chemicals 1.5 4.5 3.1
Electrical and electronics 8.7 11.0 13.5
Transport equipment 3.6 6.6 18.9
Source: World Bank Trade System.
Table 1.8: COMPOSITION OF IMPORTS BY MAJOR ITEM
(%)
1975 1980 1984
Primary 49.3 56.8 44.4
Food 1152 T-2 6.8
Fuels 19.1 29.9 23.8
(Petroleum) (18.4) (27.7) (21.0)
Other 16.0 14.4 13.8
Manufacturing 50.7 43.2 55.6
Chemicals 10.9 8.3 9.1
Capital Goods 26.2 22.3 32.0
(Nonelectrical machinery) (11.7) (10.4) (10.7)
(Electrical and electronics) (7.0) (7.2) (10.6)
(Transport equipment) (7.5) (4.7) (10.7)
Other 13.6 12.6 14.5
Source: World Bank Trade System.
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in 1984. Interest paymentj on the external debt amounted to $3.5 billion
annually in 1984 and 1985.-'
1.26 Trade Composition. Table 1.8 shows how significantly the
composition of Korea's exports has changed in the last ten years. Two trends
are evident. Primary exports have declined in relative importance and manu-
factured exports have increased their share from roughly 821 in 1975 to 921 in
1984. Within manufactured exports, light industry exports have declined in
relative terms as heavy industry products have more than doubled their share
from about 25X in 1975 to around 52Z of total exports (and 571 of manufactured
exports) in 1984.
1.27 While the two broad trends noted above continued to hold in 1985, a
number of interesting variations could be observed at a more disaggregated
level. For example, the export of ships fared badly in 1985 due to the glut
in world markets. The exports of automobiles, however, rose by 25X largely as
a result of suc.cess in the Canadian market. Automobiles are expected to do
even better in 1986 when the large US market will be tested. Another bright
spot in the 1985 export picture is presented by machinery which grew at almost
301. Textiles, steel and electronic exports fared poorly in 1985. While all
three were affected by import restrictions, electronics exports were addi-
tionally affected by a glut in the world semiconductor market.
1.28 The pattern of imports has also been changing in recent years (since
1980) because of the shift in export composition and because of declining oil
prices. The former development has led to an increase in the proportion of
capital goods imports from 231 in 1980 to 331 at present. The latter develop-
ment has led to a reduction in the share of oil and oil-related items in total
imports, a reduction helped also by strong energy conservation measures
adopted since 1980. The sharp rise in the import of coal, for example,
reflects the continuing effect to substitute coal for oil for power genera-
tion. Given the sharp drop in the price of oil in early 1986, one would
expect imports of coal to be sharply lower in 1986 as the policy of substi-
tution among energy sources is re-examined and reoriented. Machinery imports
reflect, of course, Korea's continuing dependence on capital goods imports for
both domestic and export uses. Thus even though the volume of overall imports
declined in 1985 this category showed an increase.
1.29 Market Diversification. Korea has achieved a fair degree of diver-
sification in its export products and markets since the early 1970s when pro-
tectionism first began to constrain its export performance. Among the indus-
trial countries, the US and Japan are Korea's principal trade partners, ac-
counting for over 52% of its exports and 471 of its imports in 1984. In
1984-85 the shares of industrial countries as a whole and the US and Japan in
particular have gone up, indicating a retreat from increasing diversification.
8/ A 1% drop in international interest rates leads to a saving of about
$300 million in debt service. This is based on the current amortization
schedule of total debt of $45.6 billion of which 65% is contracted on a
floating rate basis.
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Table 1.9: DESTINATION OF EXPORTS
(X)
1975 1980 1984
United States 30.2 26.3 35.8
Japan 25.5 17.4 15.7
EEC 14.9 14.5 10.2
Other 29.4 41.8 38.3
Source: BOK, Economic Statistics Yearbook.
Table 1.10: ORIGIN OF IMPORTS
)
1975 1980 1984
United States 25.9 21.9 22.2
Japan 33.5 26.3 24.9
EEC 7.4 6.9 8.3
Other 33.2 44.9 44.6
Source: BOK, Economic StAtistics Yearbook.
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To some extent this is unavoidable since these two countries have been the
main source of global incremental demand recently. The decline of the Middle
East as a destination for Korean exports has followed the decline in the price
of oil; furthermore, most developing countries have been in a state of stagna-
tion since the early 1980s.
1.30 Diversification among sources of imports has been de.ermined by
Korea's need to import capital goods for which Japan and the US are important
sr-pliers. Also, as the price of oil has dropped, the share of the oil
producing countries in Korea's imports has also dropped while that of non-oil
developing countries has risen. An examination of Korea's bilateral trade
balances with its most important trade partners shows an interesting overall
picture: Korea has been running increasing surpluses with the US since 1981
(only $280 million in 1982 but an average of $3.6 billion in 1984-85) and
trade deficits with Japan every year for the last five years ranging from
$1.9 billion in 1982 to $3.0 billion in 1984). With the rest of the world,
Korea has also run systematic but fluctuating deficits. The pattern of
bilateral balances in recent years, like the pattern of market diversifica-
tion, has been determined largely by the rise in the value of the dollar (from
1982 to end-1985) which has drawn a flood of imports, not just from Korea,
into the US market. The exchange rate realignment begun in 1986 may change
the pattern of bilateral balances considerably. In the short run (during
1986), the deficit with Japan and the surplus with the US are expected to
grow. Over the longer run, however, the deficit with Japan is expected to
decrease as a consequence of the appreciation of the yen.
1.31 Trade Diplomacy. During 1984 and 1985 Korea's trade has come under
pressure on two fronts. Exports of textiles, steel, footwear and selected
electronics products have faced 9,ncreasing trade restrictions, especially in
Korea's biggest market, the US.9 On the import front, Korea has faced
increasing pressure, especially in 1985 and mostly from the US, to open its
markets in general and to open the insurance and financial services market in
particular. There also have been demands to provide more effective protection
for foreign intellectual property rights, especially in the fields of computer
software and pharmaceuticals. These pressures have made trading a more
9/ During 1985, 207 Korean export items were covered by some form of
restriction (by OECD countries). This accounted for about 36% of Korea's
total export items. During this period, 43% of Korea's exports to the US
were under import restrictions. The corresponding percentages for
exports to Canada, Japan and the EEC were 31%, 43% and 30% respec-
tively. Of the items most affected by restrictions in 1985 the ratio of
restricted to total exports was 61% for textiles, 53% for footwear and a
high 88% for steel products. Foreign manufacturers filed 19 complaints
or antidumping petitions against Korean goods ranging from photo albums
and television sets to industrial equipment such as oil rigs. Tba US
Congress has also taken steps to abolish the granting of GSP tariff
reductions or exemptions to Korea and other newly industrialized
countries, a measure that would lead to an additional 5% tariff on
average on Korean exports to the US.
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difficult business than it used to be. Under the trade liberalization program
in effect since 1981, a series of items has been removed from the restricted
list and placed on an automatic approval (but subject to tariff) list.
Despite poor exports in 1985, and despite a somewhat hostile trading
atmosphere created by US moves to manage trade flows, Korea has stuck by its
preannounced import liberalization schedule for 1985 and reconfirmed its
schedule for the next three years. The financial services business is also
being opened up. During 1985, restrictions on foreign branches of commercial
banks were eased and they were permitted to rediscount their loans through the
Bank of Korea just as local banks do. The number of such banks has been
increased. Foreign securities firms have also been permitted to purchase up
to 10% of the shares of Korean securities firms and thereby enter the
securities business in the country. The insurance industry has also been
placed on notice that opening up to foreign competition is imminent.
F. Capital Account Performance
1.32 External Debt Developments. While external debt has risen substan-
tially from $21 billion in 1980 to $45.6 billion in 1985, making Korea the
fourth most indebted among developing countries, Korea's debt situation is not
a cause of anxiety in international capital markets. This is because there
have been significant improvements in recent years in the sustainability of
Korea's debt. First, the rate of growth of debt has decelerated sharply from
about 36Z in 1980 to less than 101 in the past three years. Second, the
maturity structure has improved. Short-term debt has declined from a third of
total debt in 1980-82 to a quarter at present. Third, the debt-service ratio
has remained around 20-22% in recent years and is judged by most to be a
manageable level in Korea's context. What is most important is that there is
a consensus that Korea's domestic economic management continues to be sound
and variation in the tebt situation reflect transitory and external influences
and are not caused by any unsustainable domestic policy configuration. This
consensus is reflected in the fact that Korea currently has good access to the
international syndicated loan (and bonds) market and can borrow at low
spreads.
1.33 Deceleration in the rate of growth of debt since 1980 has been
brought about principally by the decrease in the current account deficit.
However, total external debt rose from $42.6 billion to $45.6 billion during
1985, due in part to an unanticipated need to finance the repayment of about
$900 million of debt owed by some Korean construction companies operating
abroad. In accordance with standard practice, the external obligations of
Korean firms registered abroad are not included in conventional external debt
statistics. The total amount of such offshore debt is thought to be about
$6 billion and of this amount about $3.5 billion is thought to be owed by
construction companies. The increase in external finance requirement was also
due in part to the need to provide an unusually large sum for export credit,
reflecting efforts to boost exports in a slow market.
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Table 1.11: EUTRlYAL DEBT DEYELOPSEISM
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Total external debt ($ billion) 32.5 37.1 40.2 43.1 46.7
Nsdium- and long-term debt (Z) 68.5 66.5 69.9 73.2 77.0
Short-term debt (Z) 31.5 33.5 30.1 26.8 23.0
Debt service payments ($ billion) 5.8 6.4 6.4 7.6 7.2
Principal repayments (2) 39.8 43.4 49.8 50.6 48.6
Interest payment (S) 60.2 56.6 50.2 49.4 51.4
Oebt service ratio 21.2 22.6 20.9 22.6 21.8
Debt/GNP ratio 48.3 52.4 53.4 52.5 56.2
crowth rate of external debt 18.9 14.3 8.3 6.6 8.5
Source: Ministry of Finance.
1.34 Short-term debt has been reduced in recent years, partly because
Korea's improving external position has allowed it greater access to the
longer maturity segment of the market but mostly because Korea has taken
direct steps to control the amount of short-ters debt being contracted. Among
these steps have been a tightening of eligibility for trade credit (selected
imports rather than all imports have now been deemd eligible), shortening of
the maturity period allowed for trade credit (to 90 days from 180 days), a
reduction in the volume of outstanding short-term swaps with foreign banks,
and a tightening of the availability of foreign currency loans to fund equip-
ment imports. Despite unfavorable export developments in 1985 and an
increased need for foreign financing, the amount of short-term debt was
reduced from $11.4 billion to $11.1 billion. Furthermore, the level of gross
international reserves were raised from $8.2 billion to $8.4 billion. The
slower-than-expected growth of exports in 1985 increased the debt service
ratio from 21.5Z in 1984 to about 23Z in 1985. This is not viewed with great
concern, however, because the sharp drop in exports earnings growth is
temporary. The decline in oil prices and the recovery of growth in the OECD
economies is ezpected to provide enough of a boost to Korea's export earnings
to enable a steady reduction in the debt-service ratio over the next five
years.
1.35 Uses of Funds. There has been a change in the composition of the
uses to which externally borrowed funds have been applied over the last four
years. As the current account deficit has declined, reducing the need for
such funds, other uses such as repayment of loans, exports on credit and
increase in reserves have acquired greater prominence. The surge in borrowing
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that occurred in 1977-81 is now being reflected in rising amortizations. The
share of amortizations in the gross annual financing requirement has risen
from 29% in 1982 to 42% in 1984. It is expected to rise further to about 80%
by 1990 before declining. The strategy of relying upon export growth to pull
the current account out of a deficit position has also had consequences for
the external financing requirement. As exports have grown since 1981 so has
the amount of foreign exchange required to finance advance credit for exports,
from $583 million in 1982 to an average of about $1 billion in the succeeding
years.
Table 1.12: COMPOSITION OF ANNUAL GROSS FINANCING REQUIREMENT BY USE
(X)
1982 1983 1984
Current account deficit 34.9 24.0 18.7
Repayment of loans 29.0 37.8 41.3
Exports on credit 7.7 21.0 14.2
Other items (including reserve increase) 11.3 3.2 13.4
Errors and omissions 17.1 14.0 12.4
Total ($ billion) 7.6 6.7 7.3
1.36 Sources of Funds. Changes of a more significant nature have been
occurring in the sources of external financing. Bonds have become an
important source of finance and direct and portfolio foreign investments (DFI
and PFI), while still minor sources, have risen in an encouraging fashion in
recent years in response to facilitating legislation. Korea's gross annual
financing requirements have averaged about $7 billion during the last three
years. Of this over 95% has been funded through debt instruments.
1.37 The syndicated loan market has not expanded appreciably for Korea
during the last three years. In fact, the exposures of the large US banks
have been reduced in relative, and in some cases, absolute terms as their
global portfolio allocation strategy has responded to changes in banking
regulations and to equity market perceptions regarding loans to developing
countries as a whole. ret lending to Korea by US bankers declined from
$2.3 billion in 1981 to $700 million in 1983. In 1984 and 1985, the flow was
actually reversed as net lending averaged about -$1.5 billion. The slack thus
created has been largely taken up by Japanese banks and by alternative
financing arrangements. In particular, much greater use has been made of
bond-type instruments such as promissory notes of various types and floating
rate notes and certificates of deposit (FRNs, FRCDs).
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Table 1.13: COMPOSITION OF ANNUAL GROSS BORROWING (MLT) BY TYPE
(X)
1977-81 1982 1983 1984
Public loans 27.1 37.3 21.8 18.3
Commercial loans 34.7 18.3 14.2 11.0
Bank loans 20.9 28.9 27.9 22.1
Bonds 1.6 5.5 13.2 23.3
IMF credit 6.1 2.4 3.0 7.6
Other 9.6 7.6 19.9 17.7
Total ($ billion) 5.0 6.9 7.8
Source: Ministry of Finance.
1.38 Bond-type instruments accounted for only 6X of the gross financing
requirement in 1982 but rose to 13X in 1983, 23% in 1984 and 24X in 1985.
This substantial and rapidly increasing access to these instruments reflects
both developments in international capital markets and Korea's own debt
management strategy. The many reschedulings that commercial banks have had to
endure since the early 1980's have reduced the attractiveness of conventional
syndicated loans and increased the appeal of instruments which are transfer-
able, i.e., have a secondary market. Bonds are convenient in this regard.
From Korea's point of view bonds are useful because they allow a potentially
wider market to be tapped and the transaction costs are lower. Nonetheless,
it should be pointed out that much less diversification among sources of funds
has been achieved in practice than would appear to be the case from the
changing composition of commercial debt. This is because it is primarily
large international banks (and not regional banks, institutional investors or
individuals) who have purchased Korean bonds. Furthermore, it is primarily a
rather small set of Japanese and US banks who hold the bulk of Korean paper
with Japanese banks believed to account for almost 70X of net new lending.
1.39 Direct Foreign Investment (DFI) has surged in the last few years.
During the two decades ending in 1982 the cumulative volume of such investment
was about $1.2 billion. Since 1982, however, the cumulative volume has
doubled as changes in legislation and attitude towards DFI have induced
greater flows. DFI approvals exceeded $450 million annually in 1984-85 as the
number of industries in which DFI is permitted has been increased to around
700 currently (out of a total of 999 industrial subsectors). The goal is to
open up at least 90% of Korea's industries to various forms of DFI by 1988 and
to attract such investment at the rate of about $1.2 billion per year by
then. At present, the ratio of disbursed DFI to the gross annual financing
requirement is around 32; however, by 1988 Government hopes to raise this
ratio to around 162 as part of its strategy to diversify external liabili-
ties. Japanese and US investors account for the largest portion of DFI by far
(with equal shares of 472 each). While the investment has been spread fairly
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evenly across different industries in the past, in recent years it has gone
into hotels an4nyourism, electrical and electronic products, and the automo-
bile business. -
1.40 Portfolio Foreign Investment (PFI) was not permitted before 1981;
however, under a capital market liberalization plan announced in 1981 and
being implemented in stages since, Korea expects to remove all limits on PFI
by the end of the decade. Korea is still in the first stage of this plan in
which it has been allowing foreigners to buy Korean securities indirectly
through special investment trusts. Six such trusts have been formed since
November 1981 and each has performed remarkably well despite the absence of an
active secondary market for all but one of the funds. Another source of PFI
that is being explored is that provided by convertible debentures and
depository receipts. Fourteen companies are to be allowed to issue such
instrumentn over the next 3 years da total of $300 million has been
sanctioned under this arrangement .LH While the existing volume of PFI (of
$200 million) is miniscule compared to Korea's gross external liabilities
present indications are that there is a considerable appetite abroad for such
investments and that the scope for PFI is limited not as much by the state gs
Korea's capital market as by Government regulations concerning PFI volume.l?f
Exchange Rate Management
1.41 The principal objective of exchange rate management in recent years
has been to maintain the competitiveness of Korean exports. This objective
has been pursued vigorously but strategically since freedom of action is
constrained both by the sensitivity of trading partners and by the need to
import capital goods in order to produce exports. The nominal exchange rate
has been depreciated in small steps following a devaluation of 17% (against
the dollar) in 1980. Since macroeconomic policy has been generally tight and
inflation in Korea generally below that of its major trading partners, the
nominal depreciation has also resulted in a real depreciation: the real
effective exchange rate index has fallen 20% from 1980 to end-1985. Since the
dollar is prominent in the won's currency basket, there was a slight
appreciation in late 1984 and early 1985 as the won was pulled up relative to
the nondollar OECD currencies by the rise of the dollar. This appreciation
compounded the difficulties brought on for Korea's export growth by the
simultaneously spreading stagnation in OECD economies. Government decided to
10/ The two largest investments in 1984 were a US$100.5 million commitment by
General Motors to invest in an auto parts plant and a US$92.5 million
venture by the Lotte Group of Japan to build a hotel in Pusan.
11/ The premier issue was launched by Samsung Electronics Co. in November
1985 and was reasonably well received although there have been complaints
also that the terms of the issue were too favorable to the issuer. Four
other companies are expected to issue convertible debentures in 1986.
12/ A small amount of foreign investment is also being allowed in venture ca-
pital trust funds. The first such unit was authorized in December 1985.
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depreciate the won sharply so as to restore competitiveness in the EEC market
and the real effective exchange rate dropped considerably (see Table 1.14).
Since then the dollar has descended sharply and the nondollar hard currencies
have appreciated. Korea has, however, maintained rough nominal parity with
the dollar at the end-1985 level, thereby capturing a competitive advantage
from the dollar's decline vis-a-vis Japan and the European countries.
Table 1.14: EXCHANGE RATE DEVELOPMENTS
(1980 - 100)
Nominal effective Real effective
exchange rate exchange rate
















Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; staff calculations.
C. The Outlook for 1986
Favorable External Developments
1.42 According to the original Economic Management Plan for 1986 (which
was published at the end of 1985), GNP was projected to grow at 7% (in con-
stant 1980 terms) on the basis of nominal growth in exports, investment and
consumption of 10%, 10% and 4.5% respectively. These targets were to be
achieved simultaneously with inflation kept to 3.5%, unemployment o 4% and
the current account in balance. The confluence in the first quarter of 1986,
of extremely favorable developments with respect to three key prices for Korea
-- those of oil, foreign loans and the Japanese yen -- has made it very likely
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that 1986 will be a banner year and that the original macroeconomic targets
will be easily met if not exceeded. Thus, while Korea paid about $27 per
barrel of imported oil in 1985, the recent sharp decline in the y0ce of oil
may bring its average cost per barrel down to about $18 in 1986. -
International interest rates such as the LIBOR have dropped by about 100 basis
points during October 1985-March 1986 and do not appear to have bottomed out
yet. The Yen - Won exchange rate has slipped from 420 won per yen to 520 won
to the yen in the last three months, which amounts to a nominal depreciation
of about 25% for the won. As a consequence of these developments, Government
has recently revised its targets for 1986. Real GNP is now projected to rise
by 8%, inflation is projected to stay below 3X and the current account is
expected to register a surplus of $300 million at least. Exports are now
expected to reach a level of $34 billion. Most analysts of the Korean economy
would agree that these are achievable targets. Certainly the economy is off
to a very good start in the first quarter.
Balance of Payments Outlook
1.43 The balance of payments position should move into a modest surplus
in 1986 largely because of the dramatic reduction in the cost of oil imports
but also because of rising exports. Rough calculations suggest that if 1986
oil imports remain at the 1985 level of approximately 200 million barrels, and
if the price of oil averages $18 per barrel, Korea stands to save around $1.9
billion in import costs. There will undoubtedly be an expansion of oil and
other imports following from the income-effect of the oil price drop and the
revised GNP growth target but there should still remain a large net saving in
import costs. In the short run, this will be partially offset by the
increased cost of imports from Japan arising from the appreciation of the
Yen. Korea has not yet been able to adequately substitute away from Japanese
sourcing of capital goods imports that it needs to produce exports. Recent
data indicate a 31X increase in imports from Japan during January-March
1986. Nevertheless, the positive effects of the yen apprecia >on for exports
are expected to convert this development into a net benefit.- Korea stands
to gain handsomely in such important new export lines as automobiles,
electronic goods and selected machinery products, especially in markets where
it competes actively with Japan. Exports should also be helped by the
additional growth induced in OECD economies by the oil price drop. Early
indications are promising. Exports have increased by 27% during the first
quarter (to a level of $7 billion) as compared to the (admittedly low) figures
for the same period in 1985. Exports to Europe, in particular, are growing
strongly and have risen by about 85% in the first quarter.
13/ A portion of Korean oil imports in 1986 were covered by long-term
contractual arrangements at a price considerably higher than the prices
being forecast currently. As a consequence, the Economic Planning Board
expects the average cost of imported oil to be around $18 per barrel.
141 In the long run, of course, the depreciation of the won relative to the
yen should lead to efficient import substitution and to decrease Korea's
trade deficit with Japan.
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Inflation Outlook
1.44 There is a significant possibility of zero inflation in 1986. One
could have expected inflation to rise because of the substantial depreciation
(vis-a-vis the dollar) engineered, as a matter of policy, during 1985 and the
even more substantial depreciation, vis-a-vis the yen and other nondollar
currencies, brought about by the exogenous appreciation of these currencies in
early 1986. So far, however, there is no evidence that the exchange rate
realignment has affected domestic inflation. Indeed, figures for the first
quarter of 1986 show only a 0.8% increase in the CPI and a 1.1% decline in the
WPI. It would appear that the sharp drop in the price of oil has more than
offset whatever exchange rate induced inflation there might have been.
Government has been active in passing along the oil price cut in the
controlled prices of various fuels and oil-based products. The inflation
outlook is also affected favorably by the decline in international interest
rates. These have already been instrumental in putting downward pressure on
domestic interest rates which are an important cost of production in Korea
because of the high degree of leverage in the corporate finance structure.
Growth Outlook
1.45 The single most important determinant of Korea's growth performance
is probably export performance. Thus the sharply improved external
environment should, in and of itself, guarantee a much improved GNP growth
performance in 1986. In addition, the reform initiatives Korea has taken
during 1982-85 in the areas of trade, domestic finance and industrial policy,
should help the economy in benefitting from the improved external
environment. A growth rate of 8% should be quite possible. Encouraging signs
are already visible. According to a recent survey by the Ministry of Trade
and Industry, major Korean manufacturers are planning to raise their invest-
ment spending to W 4.2 trillion in 1986, an increase of W 1.3 trillion or
42.5% over 1985 levels. Investment and output growth is expected to be most
rapid in the steel, machinery, textile and petrochemical sectors. While the
survey estimate of investment growth is clearly on the exuberant side it does
indicate the nature of the current business climate. Gross fixed capital
formation in the economy as a whole (including the agriculture and service
sectors) should rise at about 12%.
1.46 Private and public consumption will also share in the improved
performance expected. Private consumption should rise by about 6%, close to
the highest rate established in recent years (6.6% in 1983). Private
consumption growth will be moderated by the continuing attractions of saving
due to high real deposit rates. Public consumption may rise at a much higher
rate than set in recent yeras, perhaps even higher than the 6% growth in
1985. This may happen because Government may choose to let public sector
wages rise significantly in 1986 so as to compensate for several years of
belt-tightening in the recent past. Public expenditure may also be directed
at a one-shot industrial restructuring effort whereby some ailing companies
and banks may be helped financially by Government. Increased housing and
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infrastructure construction, especially in rural regions, will continue to
attract public funds. Some deserving projects previously shelved for lack of
funds may now be revived. It is possible that planned expenditures connected
to the Olympics (in 1988) may be brought forward.
External Finance Outlook
1.47 The external finance situation deteriorated in 1985 but should be
very comfortable in 1986. On the demand side, Korea expects to run a current
account surplus and reduce ita net debt in 1986. The original gross borrowing
target for 1986 was $5.7 billion, itself greatly reduced from the $7.4 billion
that had to be borrowed in 1985. With the improvement in the outlook for an
external surplus, this target seems quite achievable. However, it now appears
that Government may favor cutting foreign borrowing even more than originally
planned, perhaps to $4.7 billion. Considering that amortization payments on
the accumulated external debt will be roughly $4 billion in 1986, such a
revision may leave too little of a margin to facilitate the export growth
necessary to meet the revised GNP growth target. Nor would such a revision
seem to be necessitated by a supply constraint. Foreign banks and investors
appear quite willing to finance the original $5.7 billion target. If
anything, country risk has been lowered by favorable recent developments. In
particular, foreign investors are quite keen to participate in Korea's bright
economic future and 1986 may be an opportune time to avail of this eagerness.
Medium Term Outlook
1.48. Korea has set itself ambitious targets for the remainder of the
1980s. Its medium-term goals are expressed in the Sixth Plan (to be imple-
mented during 1987-91) and consist essentially of a high average rate of GNP
growth (7%) and a sharply reduced average rate of growth of external debt
(under 2%). These goals are to be attained via a high export growth rate (of
10%) and centinuing improvements in the nationa-l savings rate (targeted at 33%
in 1991).
1.49 The path to these medium-term goals remains uncertain and difficult
and could be affected by factors beyond the control of domestic policy. The
principal risks are external. Difficulties could ensue if, as in 1985, a
world recession and increasing protectionism against Korean exports were ro be
encountered, or if the supply of external finance were to be curtailed.15
Such developments would place the export and savings targets in jeopardy and
thereby produce a lower rate of income growth as well as corntinued vulnera-
bility to the international finance market.
1.50 These cautions notwithstanding, the particular combination of
domestic policies and external developments that exists as present leads to
optimism with respect to Korea's ability to achieve its targets. The external
15/ The reader is referred to Chapter 1 of the Macroeconomic-Industrial
Policy Report (6138-KO) for a detailed account of the factors determining
the medium-term outlook.
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environment presently features positive developments (for Korea) in oil
prices, interest rates and the exchange rate. Should these continue through
the medium run, they will assist Korea in expanding exports and achieving a
surplus on the current account, thereby raising the growth rate while simul-
taneously reducing reliance on external debt. The domestic policy environment
features trade, financial and industrial policy initiatives that should reduce
distortions and make the economy more productive, efficient and flexible.
Should these initiatives be sustained, the prospects for growth and stability
will become all the brighter.
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